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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2-30) (Rep.Vol. 9 2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the Court below rule correctly in granting summary judgment for 
plaintiffs on the issue of liability? Decisions regarding summary judgment are 
reviewed for correctness. Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council, Inc., 1999 UT 34. 
II. Did the Court below correctly conclude that the franchise agreement does 
not constitute a substituted contract. Contract interpretation presents an issue of law 
reviewed for correctness. Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1995). 
III. Does the appellant's failure to preserve the issue of the franchise 
agreement's possible ambiguity preclude consideration of that issue on appeal? This is 
an issue of first impression in this Court presenting an issue of law. Badger v. 
Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844 (Utah 1998). 
IV. Did the Court below properly exclude evidence relating to plaintiffs' 
alleged benefit from defendant's breach of contract? The decision to admit or exclude 
evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Jensen v. Intermountain Power, 1999 UT 
10. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a class action claim seeking damages for breach of contract. The 
plaintiff class is comprised of financial planners who worked as independent contractors 
for defendant American Express Financial Advisors (AEFA). Prior to trial, the court 
below granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of 
liability. The issue of damages was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict of 
$14,109,068.82 in favor of plaintiffs. This is an appeal from the judgment entered on 
that verdict. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs and AEFA agree to many of the facts in this matter. Prior to March 
22, 2000, a Financial Planners Agreement ("FPA") governed the relationship between 
AEFA and its Advisors. See, for example, R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 10 at AX002000-17. 
One aspect of the compensation provided under this contractual relationship was the 
"Star Quest" program. See R. 1449, Dep. Ex. 3 at AX000548049. Under Star Quest, 
an Advisor's performance was measured in a manner devised by AEFA, Total 
Weighted Production ("TWP"). R. 1449, Dep. Ex. 3 at AX000548049. If an Advisor 
met minimum production goals in one calendar year, he or she was entitled to Star 
Quest benefits the following year. R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 8 at AX001623. The Advisors 
would receive their insurance benefits contributions on a fiscal year basis. Thus, 
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benefits contributions earned in calendar year 1998 would be paid from May 1, 1999 to 
April 30, 2000. R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 6 at AX001233. 
Each year AEFA would send its Advisors a "Star Chart" showing the minimum 
TWP an Advisor would need to meet in order to qualify for benefits the following year. 
R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 8 at AX001623. 
The 1999 Star Chart contained the following information: If an Advisor had a 
minimum TWP of 2.0 million, he or she would qualify at Star Quest level 1. At Star 
Quest level 1, the Advisor did not qualify for commission bonuses, but did qualify for 
"Benefits". The 1999 Star Chart said that those benefits had a value of $4,145. 
Advisors at all seven Star Quest levels had earned benefits. At levels 2 through 7, the 
Advisors would also qualify for bonuses. Id. 
The Star Chart had two footnotes. The first explained the calculation of the 
$4,145 figure, stating that it was the average company contribution for medical 
($3,767), dental ($289) and life insurance ($89) benefits for those who elected benefits. 
The second footnote read: "To remain eligible for a company contribution to group 
benefits, advisors must meet the minimum weighted production requirement in any 
given year. For details refer to Section 1 of your Benefits Manual for Members of the 
Field Organization, Form 513." Id. 
The class is defined as those Advisors who met the TWP goals of Star Quest in 
3 
1998, 1999 or both, thereby earning a benefit contribution. 
The Advisors and AEFA also agree that, in order to receive benefits 
contributions in the following year, an Advisor had to elect to participate in the benefit 
plan and pay his or her portion of the premium. R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 6, at AX001235-
36. The Advisors disagree with one statement made by AEFA: The contract does not 
say that an Advisor had to continue to work under the FPA in order to receive a 
contribution. AEFA's record citation on that point, Id., simply contains no such 
language. 
By March 21, 2000, when AEFA unilaterally terminated the FPA, the Advisors 
had already earned their benefits by meeting the Star Quest goals established by AEFA 
for 1998, 1999, or both. The FPA provided that upon its termination, the Advisors 
would not receive additional compensation except as provided by the Sales 
Compensation Plan. R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 17, at AX001977. The Advisors and AEFA 
agree that the Sales Compensation Plan includes the Star Quest program. R. 1450, 
Dep. Ex. 3, pp. AX000548-556. 
AEFA claims that it could not economically pay its Advisors the benefits 
contributions they had earned. However, AEFA's net after tax income is 
approximately one billion dollars per year. R. 1451 at Lennick Dep. p. 18. 
The Advisors admit that AEFA changed from the FPA to a Business Franchise 
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Arrangement ("BFA") in March, 2000, and that each of the Advisors chose to continue 
their relationship with AEFA as Platform 2 Advisors. The Advisors were not given 
any meaningful input into the contractual terms of the BFA. The BFA was offered on a 
"take it or leave it" basis and was "not amendable on an individual basis." R. 1452, 
Ex. C, Affidavit of William Mark Russell. Introduction to BFA at AX006857, Russell 
t 12. The BFA included Instructions, the first paragraph of which stated that the BFA 
"must be signed and dated as specified in these instructions, and NO other notes or 
comments can be written on the documents." R. 1450, Ex. 28. 
The Advanced Advisor Board, who AEFA consulted concerning the terms of the 
BFA, was not elected by the Advisors and did not represent the Advisors. R. 1452, 
Ex. C, (Russell Affidavit 1 10). 
AEFA did not notify the Advisors of its intention to discontinue making benefits 
contributions until after the Advisors had already earned or begun earning their Star 
Quest benefits. On March 10, 1999, Craig Wallenta, AEFA's Director of Field 
Compensation, sent an e-mail to various other AEFA employees concerning benefits 
contributions under Star Quest. He questioned the propriety and legality of eliminating 
Star Quest benefits. His memorandum reads, in part: 
The question that we are seeking an answer to is as follows. 
When will benefits that were qualified for via the 1999 Star 
Quest program be turned off for Platform 2 advisors? 
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What I thought I heard Jean say in her first voicemail 
response, and what I thought I have heard previously from 
others, is benefits would be turned off for individual 
advisors as that advisor's market group began implementing 
Platforms. Thus, if an advisor moves to the Platform/GDC 
world in March, 2000, that is when they would no longer be 
eligible to participate in company supported benefits (I am 
only talking about medical, dental and life insurance-those 
in the S[tar] Q[uest] program). 
I have concerns with this position from a legal and a 
values perspective. The company contribution to benefits 
that is earned via the Star Quest program runs from 
May - April of the following two years. We have already 
communicated the 1999 Star Quest program via bulletin 
#3810 which says "Advisors in third year and beyond will 
qualify to receive a company contribution toward 
benefits the following May." In addition, it is 
communicated via memo to individual advisors from the 
Field Administration department each year (there is a 
communication scheduled for next week that should be 
delayed if there is any uncertainty on this issue). 
I do not believe that we should, and may not be able to 
legally, discontinue the benefits contribution for those 
who qualified via the 1999 Star Quest program until 
April, 2001. In short, we have already communicated to 
them that they would receive this for a given level of 
performance. Similarly, those who qualified in 1998, 
and consequently receive a benefit contribution between 
May of 1999 and April of 2000, should not have that 
contribution end if they roll out in March or April of 
2000. 
I recommend we do not have a benefit contribution 
award to be a part of the 2000 Star Quest program for 
obvious reason. The year 2000 will be last year of Star 
Quest, but will be measured on a prorated basis. 
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R. 1452, Ex. I. (emphasis added). 
Although the BFA contract followed the FPA, it did not, in the view of the 
Advisors, deprive them of benefits earned under the FPA. R. 1451, John Ford Dep. 
pp. 199-201. 
Despite these stated concerns, AEFA unilaterally decided to forego payments of 
the benefits the Advisors had already earned. 
Many of the facts alleged by AEFA are simply not relevant to this appeal. For 
example, the manner in which AEFA chose to account for Star Quest benefits is of no 
legal significance. Compensation of Platinum Team members is irrelevant, because the 
members of the Platinum Team are not members of the class in this class action suit. 
The mechanisms used by AEFA to announce its unilateral program changes do not bear 
on the question of whether earned benefits can be taken away. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
American Express Financial Advisors ("AEFA") promised its independent 
financial advisors ("Advisors") that they would receive an enumerated benefit 
contribution if they met specified production goals. The plaintiff class consists of the 
group of Advisors who met the performance criteria set forth by AEFA and who, 
therefore, are entitled to recover the value of the benefits which were promised but not 
delivered. After the Advisors began working in an effort to achieve those goals, AEFA 
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was no longer free to modify or revoke its promise. 
AEFA's assertion that it retained the right to unilaterally revoke its promise of 
benefits is without merit. The documents establishing the Advisors1 entitlement do not 
condition their right to receive such benefits upon their continued performance under 
their agreements as they existed prior to March 2000. The documents provide that the 
Advisors are entitled to those contributions as long as they remain active financial 
advisors appointed by AEFA. It is undisputed that they did so for the entire period for 
which benefits have been claimed. 
While AEFA did purport to reserve the right to terminate certain benefits at its 
sole discretion, that reservation did not apply to the class plaintiffs nor to the benefits 
which are the subject of this lawsuit. 
The agreements entered into by AEFA and the Advisors in March of 2000 do 
not constitute a substituted contract for the prior agreement breached by AEFA because 
the agreements have different subject matters and because the later agreement expressly 
acknowledges that it doesn't constitute an agreement by plaintiffs to forego all 
obligations owed them by AEFA as of March 2000 in return for the consideration set 
forth in the new agreement. The existence of continuing obligations under the old 
agreement precludes the new agreement from being a substituted contract. 
The argument advanced by AEFA on appeal that the franchise agreement is 
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ambiguous and created a question of fact requiring jury resolution was never advanced 
in the trial court and was, therefore, not preserved for appeal. 
The court below was correct in precluding AEFA from presenting evidence of 
the purported benefit received by plaintiffs by virtue of AEFA's breach of its 
contractual obligations. Having fully provided the services requested by AEFA, the 
Advisors were in no way benefitted by AEFA's breach of contract because that breach 
did not relieve the Advisors of any portion of their performance obligation. 
INTRODUCTION 
"We lost because we made too many wrong mistakes." - Yogi Berra1 
In 1999, AEFA began to develop a new compensation plan for its financial 
advisors. As a part of that plan AEFA sought to revoke a prior offer it had made to the 
Advisors. It assumed it could do so at its whim regardless of whether the Advisors 
agreed to such a change. This assumption was simply inconsistent with the law. 
In seeking to justify its decision, AEFA has claimed that it retained the right to 
revoke its offer when it did not and that the Advisors agreed with its decision when 
they did not. The court below rejected AEFA's position because it was unsupported by 
the evidence and was based upon an incorrect view of the applicable law. 
1Y. Berra, The Yogi Book, p. 34 (1998). 
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POINT I AEFA WAS NOT FREE TO REVOKE ITS PROMISE OF A BENEFITS 
CONTRIBUTION AFTER THE ADVISORS PERFORMED AS 
REQUESTED 
Both in this Court and in the court below, AEFA fails to acknowledge the reality 
of what it did with respect to the Advisors which constitutes its breach of contract. It 
promised the Advisors that if they performed at a specified level of production they 
would earn an enumerated benefit contribution. After the Advisors earned those 
benefits by meeting the goals AEFA had established, AEFA simply refused to honor its 
promise. It suggests that it was justified in doing so because the contract under which 
the benefits were earned ceased to exist as of March 2000, thereby ending the 
Advisors' entitlement to any further benefit payments thereafter, and because AEFA 
had reserved the right to revoke prior offers. Neither of these contentions provides 
legal justification for AEFA's conduct. 
It is clear under Minnesota law, which the parties agree applies in this case, that 
if one party makes a promise to another which can be accepted by performance, that 
offer cannot be withdrawn after the offeree has begun the performance requested. As 
stated by the Minnesota Supreme Court, 
An offeror of a unilateral contract always retains the power 
to modify or revoke the offer so long as the offeree has not 
begun performance, but retention of that power does not 
preclude the offer from becoming a contract once accepted 
by the offeree by tender of performance. 
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Feges v. Perkins Restaurants. Inc., 483 N.W.2d 701, 708 (Minn. 1992) (citation 
omitted). 
Once the promisee undertakes performance, the offeror is no longer free to 
change the terms of his offer. "[A]n offer for a unilateral contract may neither be 
changed nor revoked once the offeree begins the performance requested by the offer." 
Peters v. The Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.. 420 N.W.2d 908, 914 (Minn. App. 1988). 
An illustration offered in the Restatement 2d, Contracts, makes the point at issue 
in the present action. 
In January A, an employer, publishes a notice to his 
employees, promising a stated Christmas bonus to any 
employee who is continuously in Afs employ from January 
to Christmas. B, an employee hired by the week, reads the 
notice and continues at work beyond the expiration of the 
current week. A is bound by an option contract, and if B is 
continuously in A!s employ until Christmas a notice of 
revocation of the bonus is ineffective. 
Restatement 2d, Contracts § 45, illus. 8. 
AEFA's attempt to revoke its offer after the plaintiffs had undertaken to perform 
is of no effect. Once full performance was tendered as originally requested, AEFA was 
obligated to honor its original promise. 
If an offer for a unilateral contract is made, and part of the 
consideration requested in the offer is given or tendered by 
the offeree in response thereto, the offeror is bound by a 
contract, the duty of immediate performance of which is 
conditional on the full consideration being given or tendered 
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within the time stated in the offer. 
Svlvestre v. State. 214 N.W.2d 658,667 (Minn. 1973). 
In short, as noted by the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals, under Minnesota law 
[w]here an employer represents in a written document 
distributed to employees that an employee will receive 
benefit payments in certain specified circumstances as an 
incentive for continued service, those benefits are a part of 
the employees compensation which the employer is 
contractually obligated to pay. 
Landro v. Glendenning Motorways Inc. Retirement Plan and Trust. 625 F.2d 1344, 
1352 (8th Cir. 1980). 
It is undisputed that plaintiffs performed as originally requested. AEFA is, 
therefore, required to perform as originally promised. 
AEFA's claim that its original promise required more of the plaintiffs than it has 
received is simply wrong. It contends that one of the requirements of the Star Quest 
program that had to be met by the plaintiffs to receive the promised benefits was that 
they "continue to work under the FPA." Appellant's brief at p. 24. While AEFA 
provides a record citation for this supposed obligation, R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 6 at 
AXOO 1235-36, the purported requirement to which they refer is nowhere to be found in 
that document. The stated events of termination are as follows: 
- The date of receipt of lifetime maximum benefits under the applicable plan 
- For medical, dental, and vision, the last day of the month in which 
active work ceases, unless retired as defined under "Medical and Life 
12 
Insurance coverage as a retiree" 
- The last day of the month in which you or your dependents cease to be a 
member in an eligible class 
- The date of the termination of the plan 
- A portion of your coverage will end on the date of termination of the 
portion of the plan providing any particular personal coverage benefit 
- the end of the period for which you last made a contribution for personal 
coverage, if you fail to make any required cost contribution when due 
- The last day of the month in which HRICS receives your request for 
voluntary cancellation of personal coverage within 60 days after a 
qualified family status change event 
- Your total weighted production (TWP) falls below the minimum 
requirement and you do not pay the full cost to extend coverage, as 
described above (applicable to the medical, dental and life insurance 
plans) 
- The last day of the calendar year during which you did not elect 
coverage for the following calendar year during the annual enrollment 
period. 
R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 6 at AX001235 - 6. 
Presumably, AEFA means to suggest that when the FPA was terminated this 
event meant the plaintiffs were no longer engaged in "active work" within the meaning 
of the provision in the benefits handbook stating that benefits terminate "the last day of 
the month in which active work ceases. . . " Id. Actually, the glossary to the 
compensation handbook makes it clear that plaintiffs remained "active financial 
advisors" when they continued working for AEFA under the BFA. An "active 
financial advisor" is defined simply as "A person who is appointed with American 
Express Financial Advisors Inc. as a financial advisor and is not terminated, on leave 
of absence or suspended." R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 3 at AX000598. It is undisputed that all 
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plaintiffs met this definition both before and after the termination of the FPA. 
AEFA's entire premise, that termination of the FPA terminated all Star Quest 
benefits which were not expressly incorporated into the BFA, is simply false and finds 
no support in the record. 
The fact that benefits contributions were not, pursuant to the terms of the AEFA 
benefits handbook, only available to advisors working pursuant to the FPA is further 
demonstrated by reference in the handbook to the advisor's "association" with AEFA as 
being the trigger which made them eligible for benefits contributions. "If your 
association with the Company ends but you return later that same calendar year, your 
benefit elections will be reinstated." R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 6 at AX001236. Nowhere in 
the contract documents does it say that Star Quest benefits earned will only be paid 
while an advisor is working pursuant to the terms of the FPA. 
AEFA also builds, and attacks, a strawman by arguing that plaintiffs are seeking 
"vested rights" to a future benefits despite AEFA's express reservation of the right to 
terminate benefits in the future. Again, this is a false representation. AEFA quotes 
this language in making its argument. 
[AEFA] makes no promise to continue these benefits in the 
future and has the right to amend or terminate any coverage 
for active plan participants or retired covered individuals at 
any time. Rights to future benefits will never vest. 
This language comes from section 9 of the benefits handbook and applies, by its 
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own terms, only to AEFA employees' ERISA benefits. "[Tjhis section [9] applies only 
to first year financial advisors, district managers within the State of New York, field 
vice presidents and group vice presidents." R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 6 at AX00139. These 
individuals are not plaintiffs in this action and the ERISA benefits over which AEFA 
reserved the right of termination are not the benefits which the Advisors sought, and 
obtained, below. The suggestion to this Court that this language has any bearing on the 
Advisors' claims is a misrepresentation AEFA has made knowingly, as the Advisors 
previously pointed AEFA to the language which expressly demonstrates that the quoted 
provision is not applicable to the plaintiffs in this case or the benefits they are claiming. 
The Advisors performed, AEFA received the benefit of its bargain and the 
promise it made must now be enforced. 
While AEFA cites Minnesota cases dealing with "post termination entitlements" 
(Brief of Appellant at p. 21), these cases have no bearing on the issues before the 
Court. None of the plaintiffs were terminated. They remained associated with AEFA 
and met all the conditions necessary for payment in 2000 of the promised benefits 
earned by their performance in prior years. 
AEFA contends that the FPA "repeatedly explained that the agreement's 
termination ended all claims a planner had to benefits contributions." Brief of 
Appellant at p. 24. This is simply not true. The FPA provided that, upon termination, 
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the Advisor "will not, except as provided by the Sales Compensation Plan, be entitled 
to any further commissions, fees, overwriting or compensation" R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 17 
at AX001977. The benefits the plaintiffs earned in Star Quest are benefits provided for 
under the Sales Compensation Plan. See R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 3 at AX000548-
AX000576. Accordingly, these benefits do not end with termination of the FPA. 
AEFA's repeated suggestion that the plaintiffs had no right to continued payment of 
benefits after the FPA was terminated is without support in the contract documents no 
matter how many times it makes that assertion. 
POINT II THE FRANCHISE AGREEMENT IS NOT A SUBSTITUTED 
CONTRACT. 
As an alternative to its argument that it was free to disavow its prior promise to 
the plaintiffs, AEFA argues on appeal that the franchise agreement signed by the 
plaintiffs constitutes a substituted contract which relieves AEFA of all obligations it 
undertook in its prior agreements with plaintiffs. In evaluating this argument it should 
be borne in mind that the allegation of a substituted contract is an affirmative defense 
which AEFA had the burden of establishing by clear evidence. As stated by the Court 
in Klipp v. Iowa Grain Indem. Fund Bd.. 502 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa 1993); 
Substitution (or novation) of the contract is not easily 
established. As we said in In re Estate of Eitzen. 231 Iowa 
1169, 3 N.W. 2d 546 (1942): "It is well settled that 
novation is never presumed, but must be proved, and all the 
essentials must be established by legal and sufficient 
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evidence. The burden of proving a novation rests upon him 
who asserts it, and where a novation is pleaded in defense, 
the burden of establishing it is on the defendant. 
502N.W.2dat 11. 
The elements on which the defendant bears this burden are not disputed. They 
are: "(1) the existence of a previous valid contract; (2) the parties agreed to a new 
contract; (3) the parties formed a valid new contract; and (4) the parties intended to 
extinguish the old contract and substitute the new." National Am. Ins. Co. v. Hogan. 
173 F.3d 1097, 1105 (8th Cir. 1999). See also, Horman v. Gordon. 740 P.2d 1346 
(Utah App. 1987). The defendant needs to establish evidence of a "clear and definite 
intention" on the part of the plaintiff to release the defendant from all obligations 
arising from prior agreements. National Am., supra, at 1107. 
Despite this burden, AEFA has never offered any evidence that the plaintiffs 
actually intended to release it from the obligation it incurred under the Star Quest 
program. It contends, rather, that such intent can be found from "the express words of 
the parties or . . . the facts and circumstances attending the transaction." Brief of 
Appellant at p. 28. 
With regard to the express words of the parties, it is undisputed that the BFA 
does not expressly say that the plaintiffs are releasing AEFA from its Star Quest 
obligations. Instead, AEFA contends that such an intention on the part of the plaintiffs 
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can be determined, as a matter of law, from language used by the parties in the 
"Disclaimer of Benefits" section of the franchise agreement. That language is as 
follows: 
Disclaimer of Benefits. Independent Advisor acknowledges 
that the Manuals, including the Compensation Schedule 
contained therein, constitute the complete list of the 
compensation and benefits owed Independent Advisor 
resulting from this Agreement or Independent Advisor's 
relationship with AEFA. Independent Advisor 
acknowledges that Independent Advisor has no claim to any 
other compensation or benefit plan, program or policy of or 
sponsored by AEFA unless such plan, policy or benefit plan 
specifically references Independent Advisors in their role as 
Independent Advisors as an eligible group under such plan, 
program or policy and Independent Advisor meets all 
conditions for eligibility Set forth in such program. 
This provision, when given its common sense meaning, acknowledges that a 
financial advisor may currently have claims against AEFA which he is not disclaiming. 
By so providing, AEFA has refuted its own contention that the franchise agreement was 
intended as a substitute for all of its prior obligations to the Advisors. The Advisor is 
acknowledging that the "has no claim" (present tense) "unless" certain conditions have 
been met. If such conditions have been met, then some of AEFA's obligations aren't 
being extinguished by the franchise agreement but survive. This is fatal to the claim of 
substituted contract. 
[0]ne universally required element of the doctrine [of 
substituted contract or novation] . . . is that the parties agree 
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that the formation of a new contract will extinguish all 
obligations under a previous contract. 
Lamplevv. U.S.. 17 F. Supp. 2d 609, 617 (N.D. Miss. 1998). 
If an obligation from the old agreement is acknowledged to still exist, there is no 
substituted contract. 
A novation requires that the pre-existing obligation be 
extinguished and anything remaining of the original 
obligation prevents a novation. 
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Teem Partnership, 835 F. Supp. 563, 569 (D. Colo 1993). 
AEFA attempts to avoid this result by arguing that the term "Independent 
Advisors" was meant to refer to a group which didn't exist prior to the execution of the 
franchise agreement and which, therefore, could not have had any claims subject to the 
"unless" clause of the provision. This interpretation is nonsensical. If this 
interpretation were adopted, then the language acknowledging that an "independent 
advisor has no claim to any other compensation or benefit plan, program or policy of or 
sponsored by AEFA unless such plan, policy or benefit plan specifically references to 
Independent Advisors in their role as Independent Advisors as an eligible group under 
such plan, program or policy" would be meaningless. A group which doesn't exist 
can't presently have any claims. Use of the word "unless" clearly acknowledges that 
AEFA believed that the independent advisors did, or might, have such claims as of the 
date the agreement was signed. Therefore, the words "independent advisors" have to 
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refer to a group that existed prior to execution of the franchise agreement. If they did 
not, the reservation of claims language would be referring to claims which, by 
definition, could not exist. A Court must not interpret a contract so as to render its 
provisions meaningless. As stated by the Minnesota Supreme Court, it is 
the cardinal rule of construction that any interpretation 
which would render a provision meaningless should be 
avoided on the assumption that parties intended the language 
used by them to have some effect. 
Independent School District No. 877 v. Loberg Plumbing & Heating Co., 123 N.W.2d 
793, 799-800 (Minn 1963). Or, as the Court stated in Chergoskv v. Crosstown Bell, 
Inc., 463 N.W.2d 522, 526 (Minn. 1990): 
Because of the presumption that the parties intended the 
language used to have effect, we will attempt to avoid an 
interpretation of the contract that would render a provision 
meaningless. 
In point of fact, AEFA itself believed that the independent advisors referred to in 
the disclaimer of benefits provision were the independent contractor advisors who had 
participated in the Star Quest program. James Punch, the architect of the franchise 
agreement, was asked specifically about the disclaimer of benefits provisions and 
whether the Star Quest program was offered to the plaintiffs in their role as independent 
advisors. 
Q. Let me make sure that I understand. Prerollout 
independent advisors would have referred to all 
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independent contractor advisors? 
Second year and beyond advisors were all 
independent contractors prior to rollout. 
With a few exceptions, that group of people became 
Platform II advisors, correct? 
Correct. 
Now, the Star Quest program or plan or policy, 
whichever you want to call it, was offered to those 
people in their role as independent advisors, wasn't 
it? 
Yes, it was. 
All of the prerollout independent contractors 
constituted an eligible group under the Star Quest 
Program, didn't they? 
I'm not certain what the legal interpretation is of 
eligible group. Prior to rollout not all advisors were 
eligible for Star Quest because they were below Star 
Quest zero in terms of production. 
Okay. But anyone who met the Star level one was a 
member of an eligible group under Star Quest, 
correct? 
Yes. 
As a matter of fact, that is addressed in the very last 
clause, isn't it, where it says, "an independent 
advisor meets all conditions for eligibility set forth in 
such programs," which would mean they would have 
to meet level one of Star Quest, right? 
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A. Right. 
Q. So as far as you can tell is it fair to say that "unless" 
clause would cover the Star Quest program? 
A. I would say it would include that but not be limited to 
that. 
Dep. of James Punch at pp. 58-60. 
It is true that after his deposition, and apparently after learning that his testimony 
was inconsistent with the legal position AEFA was advocating, Mr. Punch got religion 
and "corrected" several of his answers. He changed "Yes it was" to "No;" he changed 
"Right" to "Wrong;", and he changed his last quoted response to a simple "No." 
However, Mr. Punch's eleventh hour conversion is of no moment.2 His initial reading 
of the disclaimer of benefits provision is the only one which permits the terms of the 
provision to have any meaning. The court below, in determining that the words 
"independent advisors" included the "independent contractor advisors," as AEFA had 
previously referred to plaintiffs, applied the common sense rules of contract 
2Mr. Punch's changes in his testimony should simply be ignored as impermissible 
under Rule 30(e). In Albrecht v. Bennett. 2001 UT App. 399, the Court of Appeals 
recognized that the rule does not permit deposition answers to be changed from "yes" to 
"no" if "yes" was the answer actually given under oath. It is not proper for a witness to 
rethink his sworn testimony and purport to contradict his earlier answers as though they 
hadn't been given. "The Rule cannot be interpreted to allow one to alter what was said 
under oath. . . . A deposition is not a take home examination." 2001 UT App. at 1f 29, 
quoting Greenwav v. International Paper. 144 F.R.D. 322 (W.D. La. 1992). 
22 
construction employed by all courts. 
In interpreting a contract, the language is to be given its 
plain and ordinary meaning. We read contract terms in the 
context of the entire contract and will not construe the terms 
so as to lead to a harsh and absurd result. Additionally, we 
are to interpret a contract in such a way as to give meaning 
to all of its provisions. 
Brookfield Trade Center. Inc. v. County of Ramsey. 584 N.W.2d 390, 394 (Minn. 
1998). 
When Mr. Punch was asked what was meant by the words "independent 
advisor," he testified that "independent advisor" meant "[a]ny independent contractor 
advisor that is signing this document." Dep. of Punch at p. 58. He did not recant that 
testimony. It is obvious under the circumstances in which the agreement was signed, 
the terms "independent advisors" used in the franchise agreement meant those people 
who signed the agreement who had previously been called "independent contractor 
advisors." Therefore, any reference to claims possessed by the independent advisors 
before they signed the franchise agreement could only be a reference to claims they 
acquired as "independent contractor advisors." 
The term "financial advisor" is nowhere defined in the franchise agreement 
except as the title for "you," the non-AEFA party to the agreement. The collective 
term "financial advisors" would, therefore, simply mean "all of you" who sign the 
agreement. As the "all of you" who signed the agreement were independent contractor 
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advisors, under the BFA "independent advisors" and "independent contractor advisors" 
are synonymous. 
The integration clause of the franchise agreement does not alter this result. That 
clause reads as follows: 
This Agreement, the attachments hereto, and the documents 
referred to herein constitute the entire Agreement between 
AEFA and Independent Advisor concerning the subject 
matter hereof, and supersede all prior and contemporaneous 
agreements, negotiations and representations (written and 
oral), no other representations having induced Independent 
Advisor to execute this Agreement. No party is relying on 
any agreement or representation, or bound by any other 
agreement or obligation concerning the subject matter of this 
Agreement that is not expressly set forth herein. Except for 
those permitted to be made unilaterally by AEFA hereunder, 
no amendment, change or variance from this Agreement 
shall be binding on either party unless mutually agreed to by 
the parties and executed by their authorized officers or 
agents in writing. 
While AEFA argues that the language of the BFA contract documents 
"supercede all prior and contemporaneous agreements," it ignores the fact that this 
language modifies the phrase "constitute the entire Agreement between AEFA and 
Independent Advisor concerning the subject matter hereof . . . " Such language in an 
integration clause does not relieve a party of obligations it has incurred under prior 
contracts. It merely restricts the parties from seeking to use other matters as evidence 
of what the parties intended in the new contract. For example, in Security Watch, Inc. 
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v. Sentinel Systems, Inc.. 176 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999), the Court rejected the 
suggestion that an integration clause containing the phrase, "[t]he terms and conditions 
contained in this Agreement supersede all prior oral or written understandings between 
the parties and constitute the entire agreement between them concerning the subject 
matter of this agreement," had the effect voiding a party's rights under a prior 
agreement. As the Court noted: 
it is inappropriate to read the . . . merger clause as 
superseding prior annual contracts. Merger clauses are 
routinely incorporated in agreements in order to signal to the 
courts that the parties agree that the contract is to be 
considered completely integrated. A completely integrated 
agreement must be interpreted on its face, and thus the 
purpose and effect of including a merger clause is to 
preclude the subsequent introduction of evidence of 
preliminary negotiations or of side agreements in a 
proceeding in which a court interprets the document. See 2 
Farnsworth on Contracts § 7.3 at 215-25. 
176 F.3d at 372. 
The Court also acknowledged that this is "the universally understood purpose of 
this boilerplate clause. . . " Id. 
In the instant case, the BFA was an agreement to govern the parties' relations 
after termination of the FPA and the FPA's subject matter was the relationship between 
the parties prior to the BFA. Because the FPA had a different subject matter than the 
BFA, rights acquired under the FPA were not extinguished by the BFA. See Kentucky 
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Fried Chicken Corp. v. Collectamatic. Inc.. 547 A.2d 245, 248 (N.H. 1988). 
In the only case cited by AEFA for the proposition that an integration clause can 
produce a substituted contract, the two agreements in question had an identical subject 
matter, the amount owed to an employee for his services. Contrary to the suggestion of 
AEFA, the Court, in In re Worldwide Direct. Inc., 268 B.R. 69 (D. Del.2001), did not 
characterize the language of the merger clause as that which "clearly evidences the 
intent to create a substitute contract" (Brief of Appellant at p. 31). The Court applied 
that characterization to the following language of the parties' agreement: 
Employee does hereby . . . release, acquit and forever 
discharge the Company . . . from any and all charges, 
complaints, liabilities. . . including, but by no means limited 
to, rights arising out of alleged violations of any contracts, 
express or implied . . . from the beginning of time to the 
date of execution hereof. (See Severance Agreement at 
§3.) 
This language clearly evidences the intent to create a 
substituted contract. 
268 B.R. at 72 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, the two contracts deal with entirely different subject matters, 
one defining the parties' rights prior to March 2000 and the other establishing their 
respective rights and duties thereafter. Accordingly, the integration clause in the BFA 
only has prospective application to the obligations arising after its execution and does 
not alter rights previously acquired. Merger clauses in contracts which govern the 
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prospective rights and duties of the parties "concern future dealings between contracting 
parties, not the alteration of rights acquired and duties undertaken in completed 
transactions." Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp.. supra, 547 A.2d at 248. 
POINT ffl THE ARGUMENT THAT THE FRANCHISE AGREEMENT IS 
AMBIGUOUS CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL. 
In apparent recognition of the fact that the franchise agreement cannot be read as 
an express agreement by plaintiffs to forego the benefits they earned under the Star 
Quest program, AEFA now argues that it is entitled to jury resolution of the parties' 
intent in signing the franchise agreement. This argument is being made for the first 
time on appeal and was not preserved in the Court below. The cited portion of the 
record where AEFA claims to have raised and preserved this issue, in Defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in 
Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 337-44, nowhere discusses 
the issue of possible ambiguity of the agreement or of reasonable alternative meanings 
of the franchise agreement. In fact, in its Reply Memorandum in Support of 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 1353, at 36-48, AEFA repeatedly 
asserted that the franchise agreement's unambiguous language foreclosed the Advisors' 
claims and never suggested or implied that such language was susceptible to more than 
one reasonable interpretation, thereby presenting a jury question regarding the parties' 
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intent in signing the agreement. This argument echoed AEFA's initial assertion that the 
language of the franchise agreement was unambiguous and "it is subject to 
interpretation by the court as a matter of law." R. 337-38. AEFA never deviated from 
this position and never raised the issue that the franchise agreement's language created 
factual disputes requiring jury resolution. 
To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must give the court below the 
opportunity to consider and rule upon that issue. As this Court stated in Brookside 
Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peeples. 2002 UT 48, "in order to preserve an issue for 
appeal the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court 
has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 2002 UT at f 14. The test for determining if 
a party has done so was articulated by this Court in Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 
P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). 
A trial court has the opportunity to rule if the following 
three requirements are met: (1) "the issue must be raised in 
a timely fashion;" (2) "the issue must be specifically 
raised;" and (3) a party must introduce "supporting 
evidence or relevant legal authority." 
In the instant case, AEFA's claim of an entitlement "to present issues of disputed 
fact regarding substituted contract to the jury" (Brief of Appellant at p. 2), was not 
raised below, either generally or specifically, and AEFA never presented any legal 
argument regarding that issue or suggested that the facts warranted such an entitlement. 
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After arguing vigorously and exclusively that the franchise agreement should be 
interpreted as a matter of law, AEFA cannot now be heard to argue that the court 
below erred in doing so. It is axiomatic that 
[t]his Court will not consider on appeal issues which were 
not submitted to the trial court and concerning which the 
trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings 
of facts or law. 
Turtle Management. Inc. v. Haggis Management. Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 
1982). 
Even if the argument had been preserved, it is without merit. A contract 
provision is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. 
The interpretation urged by AEFA requires that an entire clause of the disclaimer of 
benefits provision be deemed to have no meaning whatsoever. This is not a reasonable 
interpretation and cannot give rise to an ambiguity. In Jones v. Hinkle. 611 P.2d 733 
(Utah 1980), this Court held that an interpretation which renders a portion of a contract 
meaningless cannot create an ambiguity. "It is axiomatic that a contract should be 
interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions." 611 P.2d at 735. 
The fact that a party can suggest an alternative interpretation of a contract does 
not create an ambiguity. "Of course, the fact that the parties differ as to the 
interpretation of an agreement does not alone establish that ambiguity exists." Winegar 
v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104, 109 (Utah 1991). An asserted interpretation of an 
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agreement only creates an ambiguity requiring jury resolution if 
there is some genuine ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
language upon which reasonable minds may differ as to the 
meaning. That requirement is not satisfied because a party 
may get a different meaning by placing a forced or strained 
construction on it in accordance with his interest. The test 
to be applied is: would the meaning be plain to a person of 
ordinary intelligence and understanding, viewing the matter 
fairly and reasonably, in accordance with the usual and 
natural meaning of the words, and in light of existing 
circumstances, including the purpose of the [contract]. If 
so, the special rule of construction is obviously unnecessary. 
Auto Leasing Co. v. Central Mutual Ins.. 325 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1958). 
AEFA!s strained construction of the meaning of the words "independent 
advisor," rendering a portion of the contract meaningless, does not create an ambiguity. 
The trial court's interpretation, deeming the words "independent advisors" to simply 
mean "independent contractor advisors" who ultimately signed the BFA, and that the 
terms were synonymous, is the only reasonable interpretation of the contract in light of 
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the new agreement. In fact, as noted 
previously, it was the interpretation AEFA management initially gave to the agreement. 
The strained construction it now urges is insufficient to create any ambiguity. 
POINT IV. AEFA'S BREACH OF CONTRACT DID NOT CONFER ANY 
BENEFIT UPON THE ADVISORS. 
The offsetting benefits doctrine has no application to the present case. That 
doctrine, which is a species of mitigation, only applies in circumstances where the 
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breach "obviates the necessity for the plaintiff's own performance or some part of 
it. . ." D. Dobbs, 3 Handbook of the Law of Remedies - Damages, Equity and 
Restitution, at 124 (2d ed. 1993). Because the breach by AEFA occurred after the 
Advisors had fully performed, they were spared no part of their performance and 
obtained no benefit by virtue of the breach. As has been noted by the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 
[i]n limited circumstances . . . general damages may be 
reduced by the amount of gains received by performing 
another contract which could not have been entered into but 
for defendants' breach of the prior contract and the plaintiffs 
being thereby left free to perform the second contract. 
John Call Engineering v. Manti City. 795 P.2d 678, 681 (UT App. 1990). 
When the non-breaching party has fully performed prior to the breach, he lacks 
any ability to mitigate the consequences of the breach. The cost of his performance has 
already been fully paid and there are no avoidable consequences of the breach. The 
doctrine of offsetting benefits only applies when the non-breaching party is thereby 
freed to use his time or money to pursue a new venture he would not have been free to 
pursue had no breach occurred. 
The first rule of avoidable consequences is really a rule of 
avoided consequences; it allows the defendant to claim a 
credit for an actual gains the plaintiff receives in transactions 
that are substituted for the contract breached by the 
defendant. That is, if the plaintiff makes gains in 
transactions that he could only have entered into because of 
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the defendant's breach, those gains are credited to the 
defendant. For instance, if the defendant eliminates 
plaintiff's employment in breach of a contract for a specific 
term, and in consequences the plaintiff actually earns money 
in other jobs, the money earned is credited against the 
defendant's liability on the contract. 
D. Dobbs, supra, at 128-29 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
The cases cited by AEFA are not to the contrary. For example, in Buono Sales. 
Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corporation. 449 F.2d 715 (3rd 1971), the court applied 
offsetting benefits because the 
law is clear that if a defendant's breach of contract frees the 
plaintiff to profitably utilize its facilities in some other way, 
the amount of compensating advantage thus derived must be 
subtracted from profit which the plaintiff lost because of the 
breach. 
449 F.2d at 720. 
Buono Sales doesn't address the situation where the non-breaching party has 
fully performed, nor do any of the other cases cited by AEFA. This is because the 
whole theory is predicated upon analyzing the benefit obtained by the non-breaching 
party in being excused from performing. 
To the extent that defendant's breach obviates the necessity 
for the plaintiff's own performance or some part of it, the 
breach gives the plaintiff an element of savings, since he 
will not have the expense of completing performance. Much 
the same is true if the breach leaves the plaintiff holding 
salvageable materials. The savings thus effected to the 
plaintiff by reason of the breach are deducted from the 
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damage otherwise due the plaintiff. The rule is mainly 
applicable to contracts involving a substantial element of 
personal services. For example, if landowner repudiates a 
building contract when the contractor has completed half the 
work, the contractor may be entitled to recovery the contract 
price with a deduction for savings he makes because he need 
not perform the remainder of the contract. 
D. Dobbs, supra, at 124 (citation omitted). 
Because the Star Quest benefits at issue here, though to be paid in 2000, were 
actually earned in 1998 and 1999, AEFA's breach in 2000 could not, and did not, 
confer any benefit upon the plaintiffs. 
The obligations AEFA incurred to plaintiffs by virtue of entering into a new 
agreement with them in 2000 are wholly attributable to the promises it made in that 
agreement. The suggestion that AEFA wouldn't have entered into that agreement had 
it known that it wouldn't be allowed to repudiate its prior promise is of no moment to 
the Advisors' present claim. Asserting that you wouldn't have made a second deal if 
you had known how much you owed under the terms of the first deal is no defense to 
payment under either contract. 
The suggestion by AEFA that plaintiffs should bear the financial consequences 
of AEFA's error, is, however, typical of its approach to this entire situation. It made a 
unilateral decision to restructure Advisor compensation, and to eliminate earned 
benefits, on assumptions it didn't ask the Advisors if they shared. It could have made 
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this restructure contingent upon the agreement of the Advisors to expressly waive their 
Star Quest benefits. It didn't, but it is still seeking the benefit of a bargain it didn't 
make. Neither the offsetting benefits doctrine nor any other legal theory gives it that 
entitlement. 
CONCLUSION 
AEFA promised the plaintiffs benefit contributions if they met certain 
performance requirements. The class plaintiffs all met these requirements. AEFA was 
not free to revoke its promise once the Advisors began their performance. While 
AEFA and the Advisors could have agreed to make and accept other payment for the 
services provided, they did not do so. AEFA did not make participation by the 
Advisors in its new compensation structure contingent upon the waiver of their rights 
under the prior compensation plan and the Advisors did not agree to forego their earned 
benefits. Accordingly, the Advisors are entitled to the value of the benefits earned and 
the judgment of the court below should be affirmed. 
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